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Why didn’t you sell?: How Federal Courts are Unfairly Penalizing Defrauded Investors for
Unrelated, Post-Corrective Disclosure Stock Gains
By Samir Kurani
I. INTRODUCTION
Do you know what it feels like to be swindled? George W. Bowen did.1 In January of
1904, an agent of the Aetna Indemnity Company (“Aetna”) persuaded Mr. Bowen to purchase
ten shares of Aetna stock for $125 per share by representing that each share had a par value of
$100.2 The stock actually issued to Mr. Bowen, however, had a par value of only $50. Mr.
Bowen consequently suffered a loss of $50 per share—the approximate equivalent of $1,258 per
share today.3 In the melee of the unprecedented market growth preceding the Great Depression,
many other investors were similarly defrauded.4
In response, Congress passed the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange
Act”). 5 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act made it unlawful to employ a manipulative or
deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of securities in contravention of
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations.6 Pursuant to this statutory authority,
the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5.7 Securities fraud regulations such as Rule 10b-5 are important
because they protect investors and maintain public confidence in securities markets.8

1

Bowen v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 160 Iowa 548 (1913).
Id. at 205.
3
Id. at 206.
4
See EDWARD T. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE S.E.C. 14 (1948).
5
15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West 2012); see James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the
Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62, 64 (2004) (“When Congress passed enacted the securities acts, it was
painfully aware of the Great Depression and believed that it was largely precipitated by abuses in the securities
markets.”).
6
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012).
7
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
8
See A.S. Goldman & Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 163 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1999); MCCORMICK,
supra note 4, at 11; Gordon, supra note 5, at 64.
2

A hypothetical factual scenario that may give rise to a Rule 10b-5 claim appears as
follows:
Corporation X reports that it sells 100 widgets every month. Corporation X's
stock price is high. Investors, encouraged by reported widget sales, buy millions
of dollars worth of Corporation X stock. It is then revealed that Corporation X
misrepresented true widget sales, which had in actuality been only ten widgets per
month. Corporation X's stock price plummets and investors lose millions. The
investors now have a Rule 10b-5 claim against Corporation X for securities
fraud.9
In order to recover under Rule 10b-5, Corporation X shareholders would have to prove (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter (i.e., a wrongful state of mind); (3) a
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.10
A rift has recently arisen regarding the economic loss and loss causation elements that
threatens to undermine the purposes of Rule 10b-5. Prior to 2005, there was a circuit split
regarding the Rule 10b-5 loss causation standard.11 The majority view required a plaintiff to
prove that disclosure of a company’s fraud caused the value of the plaintiff’s stock to decline.12
The minority view held that a plaintiff must merely establish that the defendant’s fraud
artificially inflated the plaintiff’s purchase price.13 The United States Supreme Court resolved
the circuit split in its 2005 decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo.14 The Court held that to
survive a motion to dismiss, a 10b-5 plaintiff must allege that disclosure of the defendant’s fraud

9

See Evan Hill, The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards in Private Securities Fraud Claims After
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2661 (2010).
10
Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
11
David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1781 (2000).
12
Id. at 1782.
13
Id.
14
544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005).
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caused the value of his stock to decline, as opposed to merely pleading that the fraud inflated the
plaintiff’s purchase price.15
Beginning with Malin v. XL Capital, United States district courts have interpreted Dura
to require the dismissal of 10b-5 claims if, after disclosure of the defendant’s fraud, the
plaintiff’s stock increased in value to above his average purchase price.16 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York then applied the Malin rule in In re China
North East Petroleum Holdings.17 The China North court held that the plaintiffs did not suffer
an economic loss under Rule 10b-5 because their stock’s post-disclosure price appreciated to
above their purchase price and, consequently, dismissed the complaint.18 Thereafter, in a case of
first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit bucked the trend and
reversed the district court.19 The Second Circuit held that the Malin rule was inconsistent with
both the out-of-pocket measure of damages applied in Rule 10b-5 cases and statutory authority
that imposes a markedly different cap on a 10b-5 plaintiff’s damages.20

15

Id. at 344.
In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09-CV-2351-TWT, 2011 WL 2619092 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2011), reh’g
denied, 2011 WL 3844221 (Aug. 29, 2011); In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d
351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD01695 (CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007), abrogated by Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; Ross v.
Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2009); In re Estee Lauder Companies Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 2505 (LAK),
2007 WL 1522620 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007), abrogated by Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No.
3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005), abrogated by Acticon AG v. China N.E.
Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012).
17
China North, 819 F. Supp. 2d 351.
18
Id. at 354.
19
Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012); Sarah R. Wolff and Jennifer L.
Achilles, Second Circuit Holds that Stock Price Rebound After Disclosure of Fraud Does Not Negate Inference of
Economic Loss at Pleading Stage of a Securities Fraud Suit, MONDAQ,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/193770/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/Second+Circuit+Holds+that+Stock+Pr
ice+Rebound+after+Disclosure+of+Fraud+Does+Not+Negate+Inference+of+Economic+Loss+at+Pleading+Stage+
of+Securities+Fraud+Suit (last visited Aug. 28, 2012).
20
Acticon, 692 F.3d 34. 41. Under the out-of-pocket rule, the plaintiff’s damages are equal to the difference
between what he paid for the securities and their actual value on the date of purchase—that is, the value of the
securities absent the fraud. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1976); Janigan
v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). The pertinent statutory authority is
a provision in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act which caps a 10b-5 plaintiff’s damages at the difference
16
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This Comment argues that the Second Circuit’s approach is superior because the Malin
rule unnecessarily increases transaction costs and is inconsistent with the reasoning put forth by
the Dura Court. This Comment further proposes that district courts hearing 10b-5 claims should
strive to determine whether post-disclosure price rebounds are a market correction to an initial
overreaction to disclosure of the fraud. If they are, then offsetting the plaintiff’s damages is
appropriate.

If the subsequent gain is, however, unrelated to the fraud, then offsetting is

inappropriate. Post-disclosure unrelated gain represents income that the plaintiff-shareholder is
entitled to receive due to his investment. Consequently, relabeling this post-disclosure, unrelated
gain as compensation to the investor by barring his Rule 10b-5 claim is unjust and should not be
permitted.
Part II of this Comment trace the history and relevant components of the securities laws
and the SEC Rule 10b-5 claim. Part II then explains the elements of a 10b-5 claim and how
Dura Pharmaceuticals affects the 10b-5 plaintiff’s consequent economic loss pleading
requirements. Part III describes how courts have applied the Dura standard to cases where there
has been a post-corrective disclosure price recovery. Part IV explains why post-disclosure price
recovery should not preclude an inference of economic loss because such preclusion would
unnecessarily increase transactions costs and is contrary to the reasoning set forth in Dura.
II. THE SECURITIES LAWS, S.E.C. RULE 10b-5, AND THE 10b-5 CLAIM
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
“Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.”21
Courts ought not forget the circumstances that bring about congressional legislation, lest
the evils it was designed to prevent be permitted to resurface.22 The Securities Act of 1933 (“the
between the plaintiff’s purchase price and the average trading price of that security during the 90-day period after
the corrective disclosure. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u–4(e)(1) (West 2012).
21
GEORGE SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE: THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905).
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Securities Act”)23 and the Exchange Act,24 passed in the midst of the Great Depression, are no
exception. Thus, a brief description of the context in which Rule 10b-5 was promulgated will aid
the subsequent discussion of the 10b-5 economic loss requirement.
The stock market crash of 1929 was one of the most devastating in the history of
financial markets.25 During the preceding decade, American businesses prospered, and the value
of securities 26 experienced remarkable growth. 27

Due to enormous profit potential and

ineffective oversight,28 subterfuge became a well-practiced art by well-known and obscure firms
alike.29 Fraudulent promoters and high-pressure salesman preyed on inexperienced investors and
induced them to invest in extremely risky securities. 30 A review of the practices of certain
securities issuers during this period reveals an utter disregard for the well being of investors.31
During the 1920s, money flowed so freely that businesses could not resist the urge to
issue securities beyond their current need for capital.32 Of the $50 billion worth of securities
floated 33 between the end of World War I and the early 1930s, about half turned out to be

22

See, cf., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 86 (2005) (noting that most judges begin the process of statutory
interpretation by considering, inter alia, the statute’s history).
23
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A § 77 (West 2012).
24
15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West 2012).
25
See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 111 (1955). On October 24, 1929, the first day of
panic, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) opened at 305.85. Harold James, 1929: The New York Stock
Market Crash, REPRESENTATIONS (Spring 2010) at 133. By July 8, 1932, the DJIA had reached a low of 40.56,
wiping out about $20 billion of wealth. Id. at 135–36.
26
“Securities,” in a legal sense, is a flexible principle that refers to financial assets sold “by those who seek the
money of others on the promise of profits.” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967) (quoting S.E.C. v. C.
M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)). The Exchange Act provides an extensive categorical list of
financial instruments that are securities including notes, stocks, futures, bonds, options, and “any instrument
commonly known as a ‘security.’” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c) (West 2012).
27
See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 18.
28
See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 28–41 (1970).
29
See id. at 29.
30
See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 14, 19–20.
31
See id. at 19.
32
See id. at 18.
33
“Floating” refers to a firm’s initial sale of securities to raise capital. ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 57 (7th ed.
2008).
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worthless. 34 The wild speculation led to inflated and unsupportable securities prices and
culminated in the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression. 35 In the
wake of the crash, America’s faith in securities markets was crushed. 36 Since the financial
markets are an indispensable element of the American economy, 37 Congress sought to revive
public confidence in them by passing the securities acts.38
The Securities Act mandates disclosure of material information and seeks to prevent
fraud in the primary market.39 In contrast, the Exchange Act addresses a wide range of issues
regarding the secondary market, 40 such as fraud, price manipulation, and insider trading. 41
Congress also used the Exchange Act to create the SEC and vest it with flexible enforcement and
administrative powers over federal securities laws.42
B. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act43 and SEC Rule 10b-544 promulgated thereunder are
the preeminent federal antifraud provisions governing the secondary market.45 Securities fraud

34

See H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 2 (1933).
See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 19–20.
36
See PARRISH, supra note 28, at 43.
37
See Gordon, supra note 5, at 64.
38
See id. (“When Congress enacted the securities acts, it was painfully aware of the Great Depression and believed
that it was largely precipitated by abuses in the securities markets.”).
39
See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
CORPORATIONS 399 (8th ed. 2012). “Primary market” refers to the aggregate of sales of new issues of securities to
the public. BODIE, supra note 33, at 57. In advocating for passage of the Securities Act, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt told Congress that “[t]his proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine ‘let the
seller also beware.’ It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence.” H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 2 (1933). The purpose of
the securities acts was to achieve full disclosure and “a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
40
The “secondary market” is the aggregate trading of previously issued securities among investors. BODIE, supra
note 33, at 57.
41
See KLEIN, supra note 39, at 57.
42
15 U.S.C.A. § 78d (West 2012); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); William F.
Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C. L. REV. 853, 859
(1984).
43
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012).
44
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
45
Hill, supra note 9, at 2661.
35
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regulations are important because if registration, disclosure, or licensing requirements fail, the
courts can still protect investors through securities fraud prosecution and litigation.46 Section
10(b) provides in pertinent part that it shall be
unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors.47
In 1942, the SEC exercised its power to promulgate rules under Section 10(b) by issuing Rule
10b-5 entitled “Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices” and providing as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.48
Liability under Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) is coextensive—that is, both rules necessarily
prohibit the same conduct.49
C. Implied Private Causes of Action for Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—The 10b-5
Claim

46

See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 11; see also Keith A. Rowley, Cause of Action for Securities Fraud Under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act and/or Rule 10b-5, 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 271 § 1 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are “catch all” provisions designed to protect investors from situations not covered by
other provisions); A.S. Goldman & Co., Inc. v. N.J. Bureau of Sec., 163 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining
that securities registration laws are intended to prevent fraud before it happens).
47
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012).
48
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
49
United Stated v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997).
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The efficacy of securities fraud regulations depends almost entirely upon the
effectiveness of the governmental entity chosen for enforcement, here, the SEC and federal
courts.50 Perhaps to that end, in 1946, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania recognized an implied private cause of action 51 under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 (the private cause of action is hereinafter referred to as the
“10b-5 claim”).52 In 1971, the United States Supreme Court first affirmed the implied private
cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.53 Since 1946, 10b-5 claims have grown
from a “legislative acorn” into a “judicial oak”54 that is arguably the most important private right
of action in United States securities law today.55
Because the private cause of action is not a Congressional product, it has fallen to the
courts to determine the elements of a 10b-5 claim.56 As it now stands, the basic elements are: (1)
a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale
of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.57 Because knowledge of the
requisite elements in a Rule 10b-5 private cause of action is helpful in understanding why postdisclosure price recovery should not negate an inference of economic loss, this section sets forth
a brief description of the elements.
1. Materiality

50

See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 11.
A “private cause of action” refers to “the right of a private party to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by
another’s violation of a” statutorily imposed duty. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The general idea is that if a statute is enacted to protect the interests of certain individuals, such
individuals, when injured by a violation of the statutorily imposed duty, are entitled to recover damages caused
thereby. Schneider, supra note 42, at 861–62.
52
See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
53
Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
54
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
55
See KLEIN, supra note 39, at 433.
56
See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-Based Securities Suits PostDura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 33 (2008); Gordon, supra note 5, at 62.
57
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008); Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996).
51

8

To be actionable under Rule 10b-5, a misrepresentation must be material.58 Materiality is
determined from the viewpoint of the investor. 59 Under Rule 10b-5, a misrepresentation or
omission is material if there is a “substantial likelihood” that proper disclosure “would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”60 Where the impact of certain factual circumstances on a corporation is “certain and
clear,” the materiality of disclosure is relatively easy to ascertain. 61 In contrast, where the
pertinent information includes “subjective analysis or extrapolation,” 62 the materiality of
disclosure is more difficult to determine 63 and requires a detailed factual analysis. 64 For
example, in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court held that the materiality of the nondisclosure
of merger negotiations depends on the likelihood that the event will take place and the expected
magnitude of the event relative to the totality of the business’s activity.65
2. Scienter
Scienter is a prerequisite to liability under Rule 10b-5. 66 Put simply, scienter is a
wrongful state of mind.67 The Supreme Court has defined scienter in the Rule 10b-5 context as
“a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”68 To prove scienter under
Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant (1) knew that the representation was
false or that the omission would render disclosed information untrue, 69 (2) or made the

58

Dura, 544 U.S. at 341; see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV.
723, 728 (1989).
60
TSC, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (“We now expressly adopt the TSC
Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”).
61
Basic, 485 U.S. at 232.
62
Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1989).
63
Basic, 485 U.S. at 232.
64
See, e.g., id. at 238.
65
Id. (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
66
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012); TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449–50 (1976).
67
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 441–42 (2005).
68
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976).
69
See id. at 212–14.
59
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representation or omission with reckless disregard as to its truthfulness or lack thereof.70 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has defined “recklessness” in the Section
10(b) context as “highly unreasonable” conduct constituting “an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care” that creates such a danger of misleading investors that the defendant
either knew or should have known about it.71 Mere negligence—that is, mere departure from an
ordinary standard of care—will not support civil liability under Rule 10b-5.72
3. Reliance
Under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must establish that he relied on the defendant’s
misrepresentation. 73

Reliance, also known as “transaction causation” in the Rule 10b-5

context,74 is established by proving that the defendant’s misrepresentation either caused, or was a
substantial factor contributing to, the plaintiff’s purchase or sale of the relevant securities. 75
Most of the circuits require the plaintiff to prove that his reliance on the defendant’s
misrepresentation was “reasonable” or “justifiable.” 76 The plaintiff is required to prove that
although other factors may have induced his transaction, 77 absent the misrepresentation or

70

See Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 618 (1991); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566,
575 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982).
71
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Franke v. Midwestern
Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
72
See Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (holding that Congress’ use of the words “manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance”
in Section 10(b) indicates the lack of an intent to prohibit mere negligence).
73
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (2013); TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449–50 (1976).
74
See, e.g., Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 728–29 (2d Cir. 1992).
75
See, e.g., Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) (providing substantial factor test);
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
76
See, e.g., Paracor Fin. v. GE Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996); Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d
337, 342 (2d Cir. 1996); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 79 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 86 (U.S. 1996); Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1025 (5th Cir. 1990); One-O-One Enters.,
Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir.
1987); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983).
77
Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1981).
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omission he would not have been so induced 78 or would have otherwise prevented the loss
caused thereby.79
A 10b-5 plaintiff may rely upon a rebuttable presumption of reliance if (1) the claim is
based on the defendant’s material omission, 80 or (2) the plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s
misconduct constituted a “fraud on the market.” 81 Under the “fraud on the market” theory,
where misrepresentations are disseminated into an “impersonal” and “well-developed” financial
market, the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of proving individual reliance. 82 Rather than
relying on the defendant’s misrepresentation, the plaintiff benefits from the presumption that he
relied upon the integrity of the security’s market price. 83 The defendant may rebut the
presumption by proving that (1) the misrepresentation had no affect on the market price, (2) the
plaintiff knew of the misrepresentation, or (3) had the plaintiff known of the misrepresentation,
he still would have traded at the same price.84 The fraud on the market rule is premised on the
theory that in an efficient market, share price is predicated on all information available to the
market, including any misrepresentations. 85 Consequently, misrepresentations may defraud
investors even if not directly relied upon.86
4. Economic Loss

78

See Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975);
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974).
79
See Madison Consultants v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1983); IIT, Int’l Inv. Trust v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980).
80
See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–154 (1972); Du Pont v. Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78
(2d Cir. 1987); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975);
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
81
See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
82
Id. (holding so and noting that nearly every court to consider the issue has also held as such).
83
See id.; Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 748 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Blech Sec.
Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
84
Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248–49).
85
Basic, 485 U.S. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
86
Id.
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A 10b-5 plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s misrepresentation proximately
caused an economic loss and the extent of damages caused thereby.87 In determining the extent
of economic loss under Rule 10b-5, courts have applied Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act.88
Section 28(a) provides that “[n]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the
provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in 1 or more actions, a
total amount in excess of the actual damages to that person on account of the act complained
of.”89
Section 28(a) is now commonly understood to require application of the out-of-pocket
measure of damages in Rule 10b-5 cases.90 Under the out-of-pocket rule, the plaintiff’s damages
equal the difference between what he paid for the securities and their actual value on the date of
purchase—that is, the value of the securities absent the fraud.91 Although the elements of a 10b5 claim generally, and the out-of-pocket rule specifically, are borrowed from the tort actions of
deceit and misrepresentation,92 there are important differences.93
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See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005); Litton, 967 F.2d at 747; Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
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Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991); Huddleston v. Herman & MacClean 640 F.2d
534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir. 1975); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439
F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971); Kaufman v. Mellon Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 336 F.2d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 1966);
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Estate Counseling Serv.,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962). But see Pelletier v. StuartJames Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying benefit of the bargain measure of damages); Hackbart v.
Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981)
(same); John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971) (same).
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In a typical deceit action, the seller’s misrepresentation is directed solely at the buyer or a
small group of prospective buyers, rather than at the public at large.94 Consequently, the value of
the transferred property is readily ascertainable by looking to the open market.95 The same is not
true for “fraud on the market” cases because the misrepresentation is directed at substantially all
potential buyers and thus affects the market price.96 The true value of the securities at the time
of the transaction must therefore be ascertained ex post by examining the behavior of the market
price in the period immediately following public disclosure of the fraud. 97 In sum, when
calculating Rule 10b-5 damages in a “fraud on the market” case, the important factors are the
plaintiff’s purchase price and any consequent post-disclosure price fluctuations.98 Even so, the
aim of the damages analysis is ascertaining how much more the plaintiff was deceived into
paying on the date of purchase due to the defendant’s fraud.
In 1995, Congress passed, over President William Clinton’s veto,99 the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),100 which, inter alia, capped a 10b-5 plaintiff’s damages at the
difference between the plaintiff’s purchase price and the average trading price of that security
during the 90-day period (“look back period”) after the corrective disclosure (this statutory
damages cap is hereinafter referred to as the “look back provision”).101 The purpose of the look

Cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1988) (“The modern securities markets, literally involving
millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud cases,
and our understanding of Rule 10b-5’s reliance requirement must encompass these differences.”).
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Harris, 523 F.2d 225–26.
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Id. at 226.
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Id.
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See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that in a 10b-5 claim, the plaintiff’s
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day the public becomes aware of the fraud).
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Rowley, supra note 46, § 3.
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back provision is to limit damages to losses caused by the fraud, rather than losses caused by
other market conditions.102
In drafting the look back provision, Congress was cognizant of the fact that
calculating damages based on the security’s price on the day of the corrective disclosure
often risks substantially overstating damages.103 Research suggests that markets often
overreact when fraud is revealed, and the price at which the security trades immediately
following disclosure may not reflect its true value.104 Hence, the look back provision
gives the security an opportunity to recover following a possible market overreaction to a
corrective disclosure.105
The look back provision, however, is an imperfect solution to the problem of
market overreaction because it caps damages regardless of whether the price recovery
was actually a market correction to an initial overreaction.106 Besides capping damages
at the mean trading price of the security over the ninety days following the corrective
disclosure, the look back provision did not otherwise alter the traditional out-of-pocket
measure of damages calculation.107
5. Loss Causation
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H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
Id.
104
See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy
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See In re Veritas Software Corp. Sec. Litig. 494 F.3d 962, 967 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003); Richard C. Phillips & Gilbert
C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for
Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LWYR. 1009, 1060 (1996).
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Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 301 (1997).
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Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 39 (2012) (citing In re Royal Dutch/Shell
Trans. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609–10 (D.N.J. 2005)).
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The PSLRA also codified the judicially mandated Rule 10b-5 loss causation
requirement108 by providing that in private actions arising under the Exchange Act, “the plaintiff
shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this
chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”109 Courts require a
showing of loss causation—that is, a causal connection between the corporation’s
misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s economic loss—to prevent Rule 10b-5 from becoming a
form of investor insurance.110
Until 2005, although the circuits agreed that a 10b-5 plaintiff must establish loss
causation, they disagreed about the governing legal standard. 111 The stricter majority view
required a 10b-5 plaintiff to plead and prove that the disclosure of a company’s fraud caused a
price decline.112 The minority view held that a 10b-5 plaintiff must merely establish that the
defendant’s fraud artificially inflated the plaintiff’s purchase price.113
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court ended the circuit split regarding the Rule 10b-5
loss causation standard with its unanimous, landmark decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals.114 The
Supreme Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a 10b-5 plaintiff must allege a postdisclosure depreciation in the value of the security, rather than mere purchase price inflation.115
The Dura complaint alleged that Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Dura”) misrepresented the
likelihood of Food and Drug Administration approval of a novel asthmatic spray device, causing
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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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15 U.S.C.A § 78u-4(b)(4) (West 2012).
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See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 843 F.2d 1326, 1329
(11th Cir. 1988).
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Id. at 1782.
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Dura, 544 U.S. 336.
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Id. at 344.
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the plaintiffs to buy Dura stock at an artificially inflated price and thereby suffer damages. 116
Considering a motion to dismiss, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court and, applying the minority rule, held that the complaint adequately
plead loss causation.117
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court noted two reasons why a 10b-5
plaintiff must allege actual economic loss, rather than mere purchase price inflation.118 First, at
the time of the transaction, the court noted, any fraudulently caused price inflation is offset by
the fact that the investor owns a highly liquid security that is still worth the inflated price.119
Second, from a policy standpoint, the Ninth Circuit’s holding would transform the 10b-5 claim
into a form of investor insurance when, instead, it was provided to compensate investors for
actual and consequent losses suffered.120
The Supreme Court noted that while an inflated purchase price may be a prerequisite to a
consequent depreciation, such depreciation is not inevitable.121 For example, the investor might
sell the securities before the corrective disclosure and thus not suffer any consequent economic
loss.122 Even if the investor holds the securities and experiences a post-disclosure depreciation,
the depreciation could be attributable to unrelated events such as changed economic
circumstances.123 Importantly, the Court commented that “[t]he same is true in respect to a claim
that a share’s higher price is lower than it otherwise would have been.”124 In other words, a postdisclosure price increase may not be attributable to a market correction subsequent to a post-
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disclosure market overreaction. The Supreme Court gave lower courts guidance by positing that
the greater the amount of time that has elapsed after the corrective disclosure, the more likely it
is that factors unrelated to the disclosure caused the price fluctuation.125
In contrast to subsequent judicial interpretations, the Supreme Court’s Dura decision
sought merely to enforce the Rule 10b-5 elements of economic loss and loss causation by
requiring plaintiffs to plead more than an inflated purchase price. The Dura Court intended to
require 10b-5 plaintiffs to plead a post-disclosure depreciation and a casual connection between
the depreciation and the fraud.126
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF DURA TO POST-DISCLOSURE PRICE RECOVERIES
A. The Pre-China North District Courts
Since 2005, at least six United States District Court decisions have interpreted Dura to
require courts to dismiss 10b-5 complaints for lack of economic loss if the plaintiff could have
sold his shares for a profit after the truth reached the market.127 This Subsection examines the
decisions and the development of this remarkable extension of the Supreme Court’s Dura
holding.
1. Malin v. XL Capital Ltd.
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Id. at 343.
Dura, 544 U.S. at 347 (holding that Rule 10b-5 complaints must provide the defendant “with some indication of
the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind”).
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Malin v. XL Capital Ltd. was the first case to preclude recovery in a Rule 10b-5 action
due to a post, disclosure price recovery.128 Likely seeking to avoid Dura’s ambit, the Malin
complaint, filed with the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleged
price inflation, a disclosure, a subsequent depreciation, and a causal connection between the
disclosure and the depreciation.129 In response, XL Capital Ltd. (“XL”) filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint130 on the grounds that, under Dura, the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead loss
causation because although share price declined after disclosure of the fraud, the price fully
recovered prior to the plaintiffs’ sale, which negated the inference of economic loss.131
The court noted that the plaintiffs’ stated intention to prove a causal connection between
a post-disclosure price decline and the disclosure met the pleading requirement articulated in
Dura.132 Nevertheless, the court equated price decline without loss realization to mere price
inflation, which the Supreme Court rejected as inadequate in Dura.133 Consequently, the court
held that the stock’s post-disclosure increase over the pre-disclosure price negated the requisite
inference of economic loss and as a result the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.134
2. In re Estee Lauder Companies Securities Litigation
Two years later, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
followed suit in In re Estee Lauder Companies Security Litigation.135 In that case, the complaint
alleged that Estee Lauder’s stock price was artificially inflated due to “false and misleading”
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company statements beginning in April 2005, that were intended to prop up the share price while
insiders unloaded their stock.136 The complaint alleged that Estee Lauder made two corrective
disclosures on September 19, 2005, and October 26, 2005, revealing that the company was not
performing as well as it had earlier represented.137 The first disclosure was accompanied by a
price decline from $40.51 to $36.05 per share, and upon the second disclosure, the share price
declined further to $30.71.138
In ruling upon Estee Lauder’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the complaint failed
to adequately plead loss causation, as a matter of law, solely because the lead plaintiff could have
sold his shares at a profit in 2006, after disclosure of the fraud.139 Perplexingly, the court opined
that the plaintiff’s argument that a sharp post-disclosure price decline constituted an economic
loss was unpersuasive.140
3. In re Veeco Instruments, Incorporated Securities Litigation
Later that year, in In re Veeco Instruments, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York considered a 10b-5 defendant’s motion to exclude from the
damages calculation (1) any shares not yet sold by the plaintiffs, and (2) any shares sold after the
corrective disclosure at a price equal to or greater than the plaintiff’s purchase price. 141
Regarding the shares not yet sold by the plaintiffs, the court noted that “neither the PSLRA nor
[Dura] imposes such a ‘sell-to-sue’ requirement”142 and held that such shares were not ipso facto
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to be excluded from the damages calculation.143 Regarding the shares sold post-disclosure for a
profit, the court cited the Malin extension of Dura with approval and held that shares that could
have been sold at a profit to the plaintiff were to be excluded from the damages calculation.144
The court further noted that if at any point prior to the final calculation of damages the stock
price rose above the plaintiff’s initial purchase price, that share would be excluded from the
damages calculation.145
4. Ross v. Walton & In re Immucor, Incorporated Securities Litigation Apply the Malin Rule
Outside the Second Circuit
In the 2009 case Ross v. Walton, the Malin rule was for the first time adopted outside the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.146 On January 9, 2007, an indictment
against Patrick J. Harrington, Executive Vice President of Business Loan Express (“BLX”) was
unsealed in a federal district court.147 Two days later, BLX’s parent corporation, Allied, issued a
press release disclosing the Harrington indictment.148 Later that day, Allied’s stock fell more
than $2 to close at $29.40 per share on ten times its average trading volume.149 Purchasers of
Allied stock subsequently brought a class action against Allied under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.150
The Ross complaint alleged that Allied failed to disclose that its financial condition was
inflated by the reporting of income by BLX, its subsidiary, obtained through the fraudulent loans
outlined in the Harrington indictment.151 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the “[d]efendants
misrepresented the nature and the scope of the government investigations” into the Allied/BLX
143
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unlawful loan scheme.152 The complaint alleged the two dollars per share price decline as the
plaintiffs’ economic loss and that it was caused by disclosure of the Harrington indictment earlier
that day.153
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint because, among other alleged defects, the
defendant claimed that the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded economic loss or loss
causation.154 The relevant portion of Allied’s motion to dismiss rested on the argument that
because Allied stock was trading above the lead plaintiff’s purchase price one month before
filing of the complaint, the plaintiff did not suffer an actual economic loss.155
The court noted that under the traditional out-of-pocket rule and the PSLRA look back
provision, a purchaser’s loss could be calculated by reference to the amount of overpayment
without requiring a sale of the stock.156 Similar to the Veeco Instruments court, Judge Shanstrom
recognized that neither United States Supreme Court precedent nor Congressional acts required a
10b-5 plaintiff to sell his stock prior to bringing suit.157 Nevertheless, the court held that the lead
plaintiff had not suffered an economic loss because he could have sold the shares at a profit
during June 2007, about six months after the initial disclosure. 158 Judge Shanstrom did not
address the possibility that gains six months after the corrective disclosure may be completely
unrelated to the fraud or any post-overreaction market correction. Puzzlingly, given the out-ofpocket measure of damages, the court went as far as to say that “[l]ogically, a plaintiff can not
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demonstrate the amount the purchaser overpaid if the stock value rose greater than the purchase
price on multiple occasions.”159 Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint.160
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia also applied the
Malin rule in In re Immucor on a motion to dismiss a 10b-5 complaint.161 The court correctly
restated the Dura economic loss standard by providing that “[i]n effect, [the loss causation]
element requires the plaintiff to allege that the security's share price ‘fell significantly after the
truth became known.’”162 The court nevertheless held that despite post-disclosure price decline,
the plaintiff failed to adequately plead economic loss and loss causation because the lead plaintiff
could have sold its shares for a profit in the months following the corrective disclosure.163
B. The Southern District of New York’s Continuation of the Malin Rule in China North and the
Second Circuit’s Reversal in Acticon
1. In re China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited Securities Litigation
On June 11, 2010, purchasers of China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited (“China
North”) stock filed a class action suit against the company in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York alleging violations of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5.164 China
North is an American corporation165 that engages in crude oil extraction in China and produces
petroleum.166 Acticon AG (“Acticon”), the lead plaintiff, alleged that beginning on May 15,
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2008, China North “misled investors about its reported earnings, oil reserves, and internal
controls.”167
From January 20, 2010, through May 17, 2010, Acticon purchased 60,000 shares of
China North for a total of $434,950, an average purchase price of $7.25 per share.168 Beginning
in February 2010, China North made multiple disclosures. 169 On February 23, 2010, China
North “announced that it was withdrawing its 2008 and 2009 financial statements.”170 China
North then announced on April 15, 2010, “that it was facing delisting by the New York Stock
Exchange . . . and that there were certain deficiencies in its internal controls.”171 On April 20,
2010, China North announced “a downward estimate of its earnings and linked its need to do so
to its misvaluation of oil and gas properties.”172 China North’s stock price declined sharply
following each of these disclosures.173
The NYSE halted trading of China North’s stock on May 25, 2010.174 Two days later,
China North announced that certain managers had resigned for “financial improprieties.” 175
During the summer of 2010, the chairman of China North’s audit committee announced his
resignation because he had concerns about whether China North’s 2009 financial statements
comported with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and about whether China North
personnel had bribed foreign governmental officials. 176 On September 9, 2010, China North
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stock resumed trading and declined in value approximately twenty percent on very high
volume.177
On March 22, 2011, China North moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the
grounds that its allegations did not adequately plead economic loss because, due to a rebound in
the share price after China North’s final corrective disclosure, Acticon could have sold its stock
at a profit.178 The court correctly noted that, under Dura, in addition to price inflation, a 10b-5
plaintiff must allege a post-disclosure decline in share price.179 The court then pointed out that
federal courts have interpreted Dura to require, as a matter of law, that a 10b-5 plaintiff does not
suffer an economic loss if his stock’s post-disclosure price has risen above his purchase price—
“even if that price had initially fallen after the corrective disclosure was made.” 180 Since there
were twelve days in October and November of 2010 when Acticon could have sold at an overall
profit, the court held that its unquestionable loss181 could not be imputed to any of China North’s
alleged fraud.182 Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint.183
2. Acticon AG v. China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited
In hearing Acticon’s appeal, the Second Circuit became the first United States Court of
Appeals to decide whether an increase in share price to above the plaintiff’s average purchase
price after the issuer’s corrective disclosure precludes an inference that the plaintiff suffered an
economic loss attributable to the issuer’s alleged misrepresentation. 184 The Second Circuit
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reversed the district court because its holding (as well as the other district courts on which it
relied) was inconsistent with the Supreme Court-sanctioned out-of-pocket measure of damages
and the congressionally-imposed PSLRA look back provision.185
The Second Circuit explained that the district court’s holding was flawed because, unlike
the out-of-pocket rule, it failed to make the plaintiff whole by allowing recovery of the difference
between what the plaintiff paid for the security and its actual worth on the date of purchase.186
The Second Circuit noted that the Malin Court extrapolated the Dura holding by equating a postdisclosure price recovery to pre-disclosure price inflation itself, which the Supreme Court had
rejected as inadequate to plead economic loss under Rule 10b-5. 187 The Second Circuit
disagreed with the Malin holding because it equated “two snapshots of the plaintiff’s economic
situation” without considering intervening events.188
The Second Circuit noted that the Malin line of cases assumed, without examination, that
any intervening losses could be offset by intervening gains.189 The court opined, however, that
offsetting fraudulently-caused losses with completely unrelated gains is improper because,

economic loss in violation of § 10b of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. 523 F.2d 220, 222–224 (8th Cir. 1975).
The district court granted AIC’s motion to dismiss the complaint and held that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his
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appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted that under the out-of-pocket measure of damages used in 10b-5 cases, the plaintiff
could establish a basis for damages either by presenting evidence that AIC stock was inflated at the time of purchase
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method of establishing damages took account of post-disclosure price recovery. The court, pointing to the lack of a
common law sell-to-sue requirement in securities fraud actions, held that the plaintiff was not under a duty to sell his
stock, “for mitigation of damages or any other purpose,” before commencing the action. Harris, 523 F.2d at 227.
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absent the fraud, the plaintiff would have purchased the uninflated stock and benefited from the
unrelated gain.190
Furthermore, the Second Circuit held that the Malin rule was inconsistent with the
PSLRA look back provision, which caps the traditional out-of-pocket recovery at the mean price
over the ninety days following the final disclosure.191 The court noted that Congress adopted the
look back provision because of the danger that calculating damages based on share price on the
day of disclosure may substantially overestimate the plaintiff’s damages.192 The Second Circuit
found it compelling that the look back provision, which attempts to limit the plaintiff’s damages
to those caused by the defendant’s fraud, stops well short of the limitation imposed by the Malin
line of cases.193
The Second Circuit decided that Acticon had adequately pleaded economic loss and loss
causation under Dura because it had alleged an inflated purchase price and that China North’s
share price dropped after the corrective disclosures.194 The court indicated, however, that later in
the litigation the district court would have to determine whether the price rebound was the
market’s correction to an initial overreaction to the fraud or whether the gains were unrelated.195
Since at this stage, a relatedness determination was premature, the rebound could not, as a matter
of law, negate the inference that the plaintiff had suffered an economic loss.196 Consequently,
the court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.197

190

Id.
Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39–41; In re Royal Dutch/Shell Trans. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609–10 (D.N.J.
2005) (noting that the look back provision is consistent with, and besides the cap, did not otherwise alter, the out of
pocket rule).
192
Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 20 (1995)).
193
Id. at 41.
194
Id. at 40.
195
Id. at 41.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 40–41.
191

26

IV. A POST-DISCLOSURE REBOUND SHOULD NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, NEGATE AN
INFERENCE OF ECONOMIC LOSS
A. The Malin Rule Imposes an Unjustified De Facto Sell to Sue Requirement Because the
Plaintiff’s Decision to Sell His Stock Can Instead Be Thought of as a Second Investment
Decision
Courts have generally adopted the notion that a plaintiff is not required to sell his shares
prior to bringing suit under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (i.e., there is no Rule 10b-5 “sell-tosue” requirement).198 Even at common law, a defrauded investor was not obligated to sell his
securities prior to bringing an action for deceit.199 Although many of the courts in the Malin line
of cases expressly recognized that there is no sell-to-sue requirement to bring a Rule 10b-5
claim,200 their holdings effectively imposed one. Under Malin, a rational plaintiff would sell his
stock prior to bringing his 10b-5 claim for fear that a price recovery may render his claim moot
at any point in the litigation.201
A sell-to-sue requirement is, however, logically unnecessary because neither the out-ofpocket measure of damages nor the look back provision takes account of the investor’s ultimate
sale price. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s decision not to sell his stock after disclosure of the fraud
can be viewed as a second investment decision, unrelated to his initial investment decision to
purchase the stock.202 The plaintiff could, presumably, usurp the Malin rule through a post-
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disclosure sale of his stock to recognize a loss and then immediate repurchase of the same
number of shares on the open market. Thus, it is unfair to force the defrauded, long-term
investor to sell his stock for the benefit of the defendant.
B. Imposing a De Facto Sell to Sue Requirement is Inefficient
Imposing a de facto sell-to-sue requirement is inefficient because it increases the
transaction costs of a long-term investor who preserves his 10b-5 claim through a sale and then
immediate repurchase of the same number of shares. This increase in transaction costs is
unnecessary because neither the out-of-pocket measure of damages nor the look back provision
takes account of the investor’s ultimate sale price.203
To illustrate, suppose that a fictional court, the United States Court of Appeal for the
Fourteenth Circuit, recently held in Nilam that plaintiffs who could have sold their stock for a
profit after the fraud became known cannot allege the requisite economic loss in a 10b-5 claim.
The State of West Dakota is in the Fourteenth Circuit. West Dakota residents, Bob and Steve,
both purchase 10,000 shares of ABC Corporation at the fraudulently inflated price of $100 per
share. One month later, ABC announces that it has been fraudulently overstating the amount of
its oil reserves for the past three years. Immediately following the disclosure, ABC’s stock price
declines to $75 per share.
Bob thinks that although ABC has made mistakes, it is a tenacious company that will
bounce back and eventually enable him to sell at a profit. Bob, however, is a securities litigation
lawyer familiar with Nilam and knows to sell his shares as soon as possible to preserve his claim
in case the stock experiences a quick recovery. Thus, Bob calls his broker Gary and says, “I
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want you to sell my 10,000 shares of ABC and then immediately buy 10,000 shares of ABC.”
Gary gets out his pocket calculator and realizes that he will make $200 for simply entering the
orders.
Such a sale and immediate repurchase, Bob knows, will ensure the preservation of his
right to compensation and enable him to take advantage of subsequent gains he expects to occur
due to the strength of ABC’s other ventures. Gary makes the trades for Bob. At this point, Bob
and Steve are in the exact same position regarding their ABC stock purchases, the only
difference is that Bob has paid Gary $200 for the claim-preserving trades.
A couple of days later, ABC announces that it has discovered a new oil field in the
country of Strakastan. Consequently, ABC stock increases to $101 per share. Two days later,
however, communists overrun Strakastan, previously an unstable democracy, and seize ABC’s
oil field. Upon announcement of ABC’s Strakastan misfortune, ABC share price declines
sharply to $50 per share, where it remains for the next few years.
Bob files a class action suit against ABC in the United States District Court for the
District of West Dakota individually and on behalf of a putative class of ABC investors who
purchased ABC stock between the time that ABC first began overstating its oil reserve figures
and the date of the corrective disclosure. The class action complaint alleged violations of
Section 10 of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.
A short time later, Steve receives a form letter from Bob’s law firm notifying him of the
impending litigation and asking if he would like to join the suit. Steve acquiesces. Bob v. ABC
is assigned to Judge Flakowitz. ABC files a 10(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. ABC argues that, under Nilam, because many ABC
investors could have sold at a profit during the two post-corrective disclosure days immediately
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following discovery of the Strakastan oil field, the complaint should be dismissed for failure to
plead economic loss. Judge Flakowitz examines the relevant documents and notices that the
class members could be placed into three categories: (1) those who sold before the brief recovery
and did not rebuy, (2) those who sold before the brief recovery and immediately rebought (Bob
was the only one), and (3) those who held their shares all the way through the price recovery to
the further decline.
In his decision, Judge Flakowitz first notes that the PSLRA look back provision is not
implicated in this case due to the brevity of the post-disclosure recovery. Judge Flakowitz denies
ABC’s motion to dismiss as to all category one plaintiffs. Then, citing Nilam, Judge Flakowitz
dismisses all category three class members including Steve because they could have sold their
shares at a profit following the corrective disclosure. Furthermore, Judge Flakowitz holds that
because Bob sold his shares, recognized a loss, and then made a second investment decision to
purchase ABC shares on the open market, he adequately alleged economic loss and causation.
After a brief trial, a jury finds for the plaintiffs. Damages were calculated using the
commonly accepted out of pocket rule. For example, in calculating Bob’s damages the Court
took the difference between what Bob paid for his stock and what his stock was worth following
the disclosure. Thus, Bob’s damages were 100 – 75 = $25 per share. At no point in the entire
litigation, except for on the motion to dismiss, was Bob’s sale price relevant. The only parties
that benefited from Judge Flakowitz’s partial grant of ABC’s motion to dismiss were the ABC
corporation, who had intentionally deceived the investing public, and Bob’s broker, Gary, who
made $200 for entering two orders necessitated only by the irrational Nilam decision.
Notice that if ABC had never fraudulently overstated the amount of its oil reserves, Bob
and Steve’s purchase price would have been around $75. ABC shareholders still would have
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benefited from unrelated gains such as the stock appreciation caused by the discovery of oil in
Strakastan. Because the $25 depreciation represents the actual reduction in the present value of
ABC’s future cash flows, rather than merely a market overreaction, it is gone forever.
Subsequent unrelated appreciation in the value of the stock should not be considered
compensation to the shareholders; rather, it is profit that ABC shareholders were entitled to
receive, completely independent of the fraud, due to their investment in ABC stock. To deprive
ABC shareholders of these gains, which they experienced by risking their money through
retention of ABC stock, by renaming it “compensation” is unjust and intolerable.
C. The Policy Consideration Espoused by the Supreme Court in Dura Does Not Support the
Malin Rule
The Dura Court explained that at the time of the initial purchase, any fraudulent price
inflation is offset by the fact that the investor owns a highly liquid security that is worth the
inflated price.204 At first glance, when taken out of context, it may seem as though the same is
true of a share that has fully recovered after an initial post-disclosure depreciation.205 Upon
further inspection, however, it becomes clear that the Dura Court sought simply to enforce the
requirement that a 10b-5 plaintiff plead and prove a consequent economic loss.
The Dura Court held mere allegations of price inflation insufficient to plead economic
loss because the stock the investor holds right after purchase is still worth the inflated price, and
the investor may never experience a consequent depreciation.206 According to the Court, the
investor may not experience a consequent depreciation because he may sell his shares prior to
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disclosure,207 or any subsequent depreciation may be caused by events unrelated to the alleged
misrepresentation.208
a. The Double Damages Predicament
In the case of the investor who sells prior to disclosure, although he may have been
defrauded into paying more for his shares than they were worth, to allow him to recover would
force the defendant to pay double damages for those shares. To see why, suppose that Jack buys
fraudulently inflated XYZ Corporation stock.

Then, prior to XYZ’s disclosure of their

fraudulent conduct, Jack sells his XYZ stock to Clementine. A few days after the sale, XYZ
reveals that it’s been misrepresenting the likelihood of FDA approval of its novel cancer drug.
XYZ stock declines sharply immediately following the disclosure. Although it is likely that
Clementine has a legitimate 10b-5 claim against XYZ, does Jack?
To allow Jack to recover even though the furthest his economic loss allegations go is his
inflated purchase price would force XYZ to pay damages twice on the same shares, once to Jack
and once to Clementine. Conversely, allowing a plaintiff who has experienced a post-disclosure
price decline and then a subsequent unrelated price rebound does not present a double damages
predicament because the plaintiff must own the stock at the time of disclosure and depreciation.
b. Solely Unrelated Declines After an Alleged Corrective Disclosure Signal Immateriality or
Else Prior Disclosure
In the case of a plaintiff whose post-disclosure share price decline is attributable only to
unrelated events, the misrepresentation was either not material or already known to the public,
and thus the fraud is not what caused the depreciation. Since materiality and causation are
elements of a 10b-5 claim,209 the Dura Court was correct in asserting unrelated, post-disclosure
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share depreciation as an example of when allowing recovery in a 10b-5 case would be
inappropriate.
Thus, ownership of a post-disclosure share that has rebounded due to unrelated events
does not offset the fact that the plaintiff was sold stock at a fraudulently inflated price in the
same manner that a pre-disclosure inflated share price does. As the Dura court pointed out,
absent the fraud, the plaintiff would have purchased the stock at an uninflated price and
benefited from the subsequent, unrelated gain.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts require a 10b-5 plaintiff’s damages to be causally related to the defendant’s fraud.
Put differently, a 10b-5 plaintiff does not benefit from post-disclosure price depreciation that is
unrelated to the fraud. Why then should an unrelated, post-disclosure price recovery benefit the
defendant?
Market price is essentially a reflection of the present value of the future cash flows to
which the shareholder is entitled.

When a corporation discloses that it made a material

misrepresentation, the expected value of the future cash flows decreases, and thus the present
value of the stock depreciates. Subsequent appreciation in the value of the stock may be the
result of an expected increase in future cash flows due to unrelated circumstances, or it may be
the result of the market realizing that the fraud will not have as big of an impact on future cash
flows as previously thought. The portion of depreciation in the stock that correctly reflects the
decrease in the expected cash flows caused by revelation of the fraud, as opposed to a market
overreaction, represents actual economic loss.

Subsequent unrelated appreciations do not

compensate the investor for these losses, because absent the fraud, the stock would have retained
its value, and the shareholder would have benefited from the unrelated gain.
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Instead of the Malin rule, trial courts should require the plaintiff to prove that postdisclosure depreciations were caused by revelations of the defendant’s fraud.

Given the

complexity of financial markets, this may seem like an arduous task, but if the stock price drops
on high volume immediately following disclosure there can be little doubt as to its genesis.
Once the plaintiff has carried his burden of proving that losses were caused by the defendant’s
fraud, the burden should shift to the defendant to prove that subsequent gains were related and
should offset the plaintiff’s damages, dollar for dollar. This analysis is much more difficult but
should consider factors such as the amount of time that has elapsed since disclosure (i.e., the
more time that has elapsed, the more likely it is that gains are unrelated),210 and whether there are
other circumstances that have surfaced since disclosure that would tend to cause the stock to
appreciate (other revelations and events indicate that the gain is unrelated).
Holding that post-disclosure appreciation to above the plaintiff’s purchase price precludes
economic loss as a matter of law works an injustice on the 10b-5 plaintiff and benefits the
corporations that engage in fraudulent behavior. As such, the Malin rule should be overruled
throughout the United States and replaced with a standard that strives to determine what loss was
caused by the fraud and what loss what caused by market overreaction. Though this task may
prove difficult, imprecision in the damages award is still better than denying victims of corporate
fraud compensation for their real and irretrievable losses.
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